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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the presence of independent directors on firm value using
both market-based performance measures (Tobin’s Q ratio and EVA) and accounting-based
ratios (ROA and ROE). We find that, instead of adding value, independent directors in New
Zealand negatively affect firm value. We also find that, consistent with stewardship theory,
independent directors have a positive effect on firm value only when they are in the minority.
These findings are important given the increasing trend toward independence in corporate
boards around the globe and suggest that board independence may not generally be suitable
for countries where managers are considered as active partners along with other stakeholders
in companies.
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Introduction
In response to major corporate failures in the last decade or so, public authorities around the
world have introduced new governance codes and guidelines. Among other aspects, they
focus on board composition and conduct, particularly emphasising the independence of
boards. Independent directors, considered to be the “custodians of the governance process,”
are assumed to have less or no conflicts of interest in the companies they serve. The
justification is that board members with a connection to the company or its management do
not assess company performance impartially and might even collude with managers, as they
could have a vested interest in the company’s business dealings. The presence of independent
directors on boards is supposed to add more value, as these directors impartially oversee the
executive directors. This concept seems to have been accepted as conventional wisdom
around the world. Many corporate governance advocates suggest that a board should be made
up of all or a majority of independent directors, while others suggest that a board should
include a balance of independent and executive directors (see for example, American Law
Institute 1994; Business Roundtable 2010; Council of Institutional Investors 2011; Financial
Markets Authority 2004). Although the use of independent directors has become increasingly
accepted, especially in Anglo-American countries where the stock market performance of
listed companies attracts a great deal of interest from the public, some scholars question its
rationale (e.g., Bhagat & Black 2002; Black, De Carvaho & Gorga 2010; Chhaochharia &
Grinstein 2007; Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2008; Donaldson & Davis 1991; Duchin, Matsusaka
& Ozbas 2010; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Muth & Donaldson 1998; Nicholson & Kiel
2007). These critics argue that monitoring by independent directors can be ineffective. They
point out that, while independent board members could be independent in their evaluation of
corporate performance, they usually have much less knowledge of the company and their
judgment is largely based on (biased) information provided by the managers. Moreover,
while the profile of independent board members is clearly defined by law and regulations,
there is a small pool of talented independent directors available in many smaller countries,
ultimately forcing corporations to have either time-constrained skilled independent board
members who hold multiple positions or less competent independent directors on their
boards. In recent years, a growing trend in hiring outside professionals has prompted
researchers to investigate whether their presence actually has a positive impact on corporate
performance.
The existing literature does not demonstrate a definitive relationship between board
composition and corporate performance. Empirical evidence on the association between the
presence of independent directors and firm performance is equivocal. Independent directors,
for example, have been reported to have a positive effect on firm performance in several
European countries (Krivogorsky 2006), New Zealand (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001), Korea
(Black Jang & Kim 2006), Scandinavia (Oxelheim & Randoy 2003) and Chile (Lefort &
Urzua 2008). However, except for small firms (Daily & Dalton 1992), the presence of
independent directors on corporate boards in the US has been observed to have a negative
impact on firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Bhagat & Black 2002; Dalton et al.
1998; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991; Yermack 1996). Similar results have been documented
for Canadian firms (Klein, Shapiro & Young 2004, 2005), Australian firms (Lawrence &
Stapledon, 1999) and Brazilian firms (Black et al. 2010). The negative effect of independent
directors on firm performance certainly contradicts the accepted corporate governance norms
that favor board independence. Additionally, there are several other studies reporting that
independent directors have no significant effect on firm performance whatsoever (see, for
example, Adjaoud, Zeghal & Andaleeb 2007; Pham, Suchard & Zein 2008). More recently,
Erkens, Hung and Matos (2010) observed that board independence was negatively correlated
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with accumulated stock returns during the 2007 financial crisis, whereas Duchin et al. (2010)
reported that outside directors can increase (decrease) firm value when information cost is
low (high). All of these studies suggest that the verdict on the usefulness of independent
directors is far from settled and that we cannot develop a generalised conclusion based on
international evidence.
In this paper, we investigate if “board independence matters” using data from New
Zealand, which has a much smaller capital market in both absolute and relative (to its GDP)
terms as compared with many other developed markets. We believe that the New Zealand
market provides an interesting setting to explore this issue for several reasons. First, the
proportion of independent directors on New Zealand firm boards has been increasing since
the introduction of the New Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code in October
2003 to such an extent that currently independent directors form the majority on corporate
boards. A previous study of New Zealand covered a period when the concept of
independence had just been introduced and independent board members were a minority. It is
necessary to investigate a more recent period reflecting more recently accepted practices.
Second, listed New Zealand firms have quite a high ownership concentration. As the impact
of independent directors on firm performance in highly concentrated ownership firms has still
not been settled (Klein et al. 2005, Krivogorsky 2006; Lefort & Urzua 2008), the results from
our study are expected to contribute to the debate in the literature. Third, a recent study has
contended that directors of New Zealand firms put less weight on their monitoring role and
are evolving towards a more collaborative role with management (Anderson, Melanson &
Maly 2007). These changes in the directors’ views and practices are more consistent with
stewardship theory than with agency theory. In addition to traditionally employed measures
such as Tobin’s Q and accounting performance measures, we further contribute to the
literature by employing Economic Value Added (EVA) as an alternative performance
measure to examine the effects of independent directors on firm value.
Our results generally indicate that, instead of adding value, independent directors in
New Zealand have a negative impact on firm values which is in line with recent findings in
this literature (Black et al. 2010; Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2007; Duchin et al. 2010) This
finding is important given the increasing trend of independence in New Zealand firm boards
and suggests that board independence, which is considered to be a better monitoring function,
may not be suitable for firms in this country.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews
the relevant literature linking independent directors to firm performance and develops our
hypotheses. The third section describes the methodology and data. The fourth section
discusses the results and the fifth shows the robustness of the results while the final section
concludes.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Why do independent directors in different countries have different effects on firm
performance? It is well known that corporate performance and its relationship to the board
need to be studied within the broader picture of the corporate structure and governance of a
country. One possibility is the institutional and corporate structure differences among the
countries studied. For example, the level of ownership concentration may influence the
effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring firm performance (Lawrence &
Stapledon 1999). This is an important issue to be considered in the present study. Healy
(2003) documented that institutional ownership is approximately 76% in New Zealand, which
is much higher than in the US or the UK, where institutional ownership is 39.8% and 60.8%,
respectively. The high level of ownership concentration in New Zealand could act as a
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substitute for the weak legal protection of investors and its less developed capital market
(Mikkelson & Partch 1997; Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Highly concentrated ownership could
increase the alignment of incentive of managers and large shareholders, which would
minimise agency problems, resulting in improved firm performance. It could also be argued
that a high level of ownership concentration can cause an “entrenchment effect” and have
negative effects on company performance and valuation (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988).
That is, at higher levels of ownership concentration, large shareholders may make suboptimal
decisions that benefit their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, which could
deteriorate the firm’s performance and valuation. The empirical evidence on the relationship
between independent directors and the performance of highly concentrated ownership firms
is mixed. Klein et al. (2004, 2005) reported a negative relationship between performance and
the presence of independent directors of highly concentrated ownership firms in Canada,
while several other studies have found a positive relation for similar firms, for example, in
New Zealand (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001), European countries (Krivogorsky 2006) and
Chile (Lefort & Urzua 2008).
Another possibility for the mixed results on the impact of independent directors on
firm performance could be the choice of performance measure. Most previous studies used
Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance. Tobin’s Q, however, does not always indicate firm
performance. It could also reflect growth opportunities related not to managerial decisions
but to external conditions (Pham, Suchard & Zein 2007). Because the effects of independent
directors on firm performance may differ depending on the performance measures used,
different measures of firm performance may produce different results (Krivogorsky 2006;
Lawrence & Stapledon 1999). A recent study by Elali (2006) found that Economic Value
Added (EVA) outperforms Tobin’s Q in explaining shareholder wealth. Except for Adjaoud
et al. (2007) and Pham et al. (2008), there have been a limited number of studies that directly
examine the effects of independent directors on firm performance using EVA as a
performance measure. Interestingly, both studies report an insignificant relationship between
board independence and EVA.
A further possibility for the ambiguous results could be that not all independent
directors are truly independent or add value (Bhagat & Black 2002). In a recent paper, Cohen,
Frazzini and Malloy (2010) showed that, in the US, while firms technically appoint
independent directors based on regulatory definition, in reality, the independent directors are
overly sympathetic to management. Based on a hand-collected database, the authors found
that financial analysts who were overly optimistic regarding the firms’ performance in the
past were more likely to be appointed as independent directors of those firms. Furthermore,
the issue of whether the independent directors are in the majority could also play a role. In
studies documenting a positive relationship between independent directors and firm
performance, the mean proportion of independent directors is less than 50% (see for example,
Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Black et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 1998; Hossain, Prevost & Rao
2001; Krivogorsky 2006; Lefort & Urzua 2008; Mura 2007; Oxelheim & Randoy 2003;
Yermack 1996). These results could suggest that independent directors add value when they
are in the minority on the board.
Previous literature on the relationship between board composition and firm
performance generally recognises two theories: agency theory and stewardship theory
(Nicholson & Kiel 2007). Agency theory, which dominates the corporate governance
literature, has its basis in the separation of ownership and management and the divergent
interests between the two. As such, it requires control of management by boards of directors
operating as agents for the owners. External directors are expected to be free from the
influence of the firm’s management, which allows them to perform their duties more
effectively and provide more value than internal directors. Effective monitoring by
6
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independent directors is expected to lower agency costs and increase firm performance
(Baysinger & Butler 1985; Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Lefort & Urzua 2008).
Therefore, according to this theory, board independence should be positively
associated with firm performance. Despite substantial research, as discussed earlier, on the
relationship between boards and firm performance, the extant empirical results are far from
conclusive.
Stewardship theory refutes the notion of self-interested managers, claiming that
managers and non-independent directors are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them
and can be trusted to maximise the value of firms. Managers are driven by non-financial
motives, such as the need for achievement and recognition, the satisfaction of successful
performance and a strong work ethic (Donaldson & Davis 1991; Muth & Donaldson 1998).
Thus, demands for extensive monitoring and controls by external directors are not needed.
Non-independent directors involved in the company on a daily basis are assumed to have a
better commitment to the company and its goal. However, independent directors may not
have the necessary skills and knowledge, may be less committed to the company and may
“fail to support and empower management and reduce company performance” (Muth &
Donaldson 1998, p. 10).
A recent study has found that, in the period after the New Zealand Corporate
Governance Best Practice Code was introduced, directors of New Zealand firms viewed their
roles more as active partners with management rather than as monitors (Anderson et al.
2007). As a matter of law in New Zealand, directors must act in what they consider to be the
best interest of the company which may not necessarily mean acting in the best interest of
shareholders. This is in line with the emerging view that the conventional notion of a board’s
control role, originating from agency theory, should expand to incorporate a service role
“where the board is expected also to be more active in setting the strategic direction and
decision making of the firm in conjunction with management” (Ingley & Karoui 2010,
p.129). These collaborative views and practices are more consistent with stewardship theory
than with agency theory.
The controversy regarding the role of internal and external directors is at the heart of
both agency and stewardship theory. We investigate which of these theories is more relevant
and supportive of the current situation in New Zealand. We contend that, when there is a
majority of internal directors in firms, it could be beneficial for firms. Therefore, our
hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Independent directors are negatively related to firm performance.
H2: Independent directors add value as long as they are the minority on a board.
Data and Methodology
Data
We obtain financial data of firms listed in New Zealand from the NZX Deep Archive
database from 2004 to 2006 and hand collect corporate governance information from the
firms’ annual reports. We exclude firm-year observations that do not have the necessary
variables to run the regression model and extreme firm performance variables below the 1st
percentile and above the 99th percentile. The final sample consists of 182 firm-year
observations.
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Methodology
We examine the effects of independent directors on firm performance by regressing measures
of firm performance as the dependent variable on several corporate governance and control
variables. The performance measures that we use are: EVA, Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE.
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt
divided by total assets. ROA is calculated as the net income divided by total assets, and ROE
is calculated as the net income divided by total equity.
EVA is defined as:
EVA = IC x (ROIC - WACC).

(1)

where:
IC = Invested capital at the beginning of the year calculated as total assets at t-1 and non-interest-bearing
liabilities at t-1
ROIC = Return on Invested Capital = NOPLAT/invested capital at the beginning of the year
NOPLAT = EBIT – taxes + changes in balance sheet deferred taxes
Taxes = Income tax + tax shield on interest expense
WACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital
We deflated EVA by 1,000,000 so that the scale would be consistent with that of the other variables (Adjaoud et
al. 2007).

To examine the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm
performance, we use the following model:
Performancet     1 % INDt   2 BDSIZEt   3 BUSYt   4 ACSIZE t   5 BLOCK t
  6 LEVt   7 B / M t   8 SIZE t   t

(2)

The independent variable, % IND, is the proportion of independent directors and is
calculated as the number of independent directors divided by the total number of directors.
Independent directors are defined according to New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules,
i.e., as non-executive directors holding less than 5% of the voting securities and having no
direct or indirect interest or relationship that could reasonably influence their objective
judgment and decision making. The existing literature on board size (BDSIZE) and firm
performance usually reports that board size is negatively correlated with firm performance
(Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells 1998; Larcker, Richardson & Tuna 2007; Yermack 1996).
Smaller boards are expected to work more efficiently than larger boards. Furthermore,
Larcker et al. (2007) reported that the busier the directors, the lower the firm performance.
The variable BUSY is the percentage of busy independent directors. An independent director
is classified as a busy director if he or she serves as a director at more than three other
companies. Larcker et al. (2007) also found that firms with a greater proportion of
blockholders exhibit superior operating performance. However, Hossain, Prevost and Rao
(2001) and Bhagat and Black (2002) found that blockholders are negatively correlated with
firm performance. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders
holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. As discussed earlier, this variable is
important in our study, as the New Zealand listed firms generally have high levels of
ownership concentration. We also include audit committee size (ACSIZE) in our analysis, as
8
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audit committees are expected to enhance the monitoring role of directors. Finally, we
incorporate several commonly used control variables into our regressions. These variables are
LEV, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; B/M, the book to market ratio; and SIZE, the
natural logarithm of the market value of equities.
In studies of firm performance and its relationship to corporate governance factors,
which, in our case, is board composition, the issue of endogeneity needs to be addressed (see
for example, Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach 1991). In addition to
employing OLS regressions, we address this issue by using two-stage least square
regressions. Following Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell
(2008), we use the lagged values of independent variables as instruments for independent
directors. Similar to Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), in this estimation procedure, we assume
that firm performance and independent directors are the only endogenous variables.2
We further use lagged values of firm performance as independent variables (Hermalin
& Weisbach 1991; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002) to examine whether the independent directors’
choice to sit on a board is affected by the firm’s past performance. To accomplish this, we
include the percentage of shares owned by independent directors as a control variable
(Whidbee 1997).
Our second hypothesis is that independent directors add value as long as they are in
the minority on a board. To test this hypothesis, we replace %IND with a dummy variable
(NIND) that takes the value of 1 if independent directors are the minority and takes 0
otherwise. The second model we use is the following:

Performanc et     1 NIND t   2 BDSIZE t   3 BUSY t   4 ACSIZE t   5 BLOCK t
  6 LEV t   7 B / M t   8 SIZE t   t

(3)

Empirical Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample firms. On average, as shown by positive
firm performance across the four performance measures, New Zealand firms are profitable.
The results show that Tobin’s Q is approximately 1.65, return on assets is 9.5% and return on
equity is 19%. These returns are well above the average Official Cash Rate, the prime rate in
New Zealand, of 6.6% during the same period. In terms of EVA, the sample firms did not
experience a significant increase in value. The average EVA is only around $0.002 million,
which is only 0.001% of the average firm size.
Our data also reveal that there are, on average, six directors on a board. The number
of directors is lower than that of US firms, which is around 12 directors (Yermack, 1996;
Bhagat and Black, 2002). Board independence ranges from no independence to fully
independent. Typically, however, independent directors are the majority on a board. The
mean proportion of independent directors is 0.52.
2

Our two-stage least square regression approach, however, is subject to some limitations. Some may view board
size and blockholders as also endogenous. The inclusion of more than one endogenous variable, however, would
involve the difficult task of finding instrumental variables for each equation (Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan
1995; Ittner & Larcker 2001; Rajgopal & Shevlin 2002). There is also a possibility that our system of equations
is misspecified because of the omitted variable problem. However, according to Hausman tests that we
conducted to examine whether independent directors and performance should be treated as endogenous,
endogeneity is rejected for all four performance variables.
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Table 1 further shows that, on average, about 40% of independent directors serve as
directors in more than three other companies, which is on the lower end internationally. For
instance, the percentage in the US is closer to 60%. The mean cumulative percentage of
shares held by shareholders holding more than 5% is 45%, reflecting the fact that the
ownership of listed firms in New Zealand is highly concentrated. This figure is close to that
of Laporta et al. (1998), who reported the mean shares owned by blockholders in New
Zealand at 48%. High ownership concentration can discourage efficiency-enhancing
takeovers as a transfer of control can take place with the consent of only a limited number of
large blockholders (Prevost, Rao & Hossain 2002). The presence of large blockholders could
protect the board from external market discipline, which reduces value. But their presence
could also enhance the effectiveness of independent directors in monitoring firm performance
(Larcker et al. 2007).
Table 1
Sample descriptive statistics
MEAN

SD

MIN

25TH

MEDIAN

75TH

MAX

Tobin’s Q

1.647

1.348

0.341

0.948

1.169

1.853

8.243

ROA

0.095

0.119

-0.571

0.063

0.089

0.146

0.393

ROE

0.190

0.214

-0.874

0.105

0.170

0.297

0.812

EVA (in millions)

0.002

0.018

-0.126

-0.001

0.001

0.006

0.065

%IND

0.519

0.224

0.000

0.333

0.500

0.667

1.000

NIND

0.466

0.501

0.000

0.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

BDSIZE

6.165

1.660

2.000

5.000

6.000

7.000

12.000

BUSY

0.391

0.345

0.000

0.000

0.333

0.667

1.000

ACSIZE

3.363

1.077

0.000

3.000

3.000

4.000

7.000

BLOCK

0.451

0.250

0.000

0.259

0.465

0.655

0.944

LEV

0.422

0.195

0.020

0.290

0.406

0.550

1.228

B/M
0.765
0.868
-0.175
0.325
0.604
0.994
10.044
MKTVAL (in
11.609
1.408
8.117
10.524
11.609
12.618
14.776
millions)
Notes:
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is
return on assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested
capital – weighted average cost of capital). %IND is the proportion of independent directors on a board defined
as the number of independent directors/total number of directors. NIND is a dummy variable of 1 if a firm board
is nonindependent. BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who
serve in more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK
is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm.
LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio and MKTVAL is the market value equity. There
are 182 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2006.

Table 2 presents the correlations among the variables. Tobin’s Q is not significantly
correlated with the other three performance variables. ROA and ROE are highly correlated
(0.79). EVA as a measure of value added is not highly correlated with these two accountingbased profitability measures. This finding could be seen as consistent with the views of the
proponents of EVA that positive accounting-based profit measures do not always increase
firm value.
As predicted, the correlations between the proportion of independent directors
(%IND) and the three performance measures (ROA, ROE and EVA) are strongly negative.
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Koerniadi & Tourani-Rad Does Board Independence Matter?

Although statistically insignificant, negative performance relations are also observed for
board size (BDSIZE). The proportion of busy independent directors is negatively correlated
with Tobin’s Q. This finding could be interpreted as in line with stewardship theory, which
states that busy independent directors are not fully committed to the companies they serve.
Block ownership is negatively correlated with the proportion of independent directors,
suggesting that block owners and the proportion of independent directors substitute for
monitors. Block ownership is also negatively correlated with EVA, which suggests that high
ownership decreases firm value.
Table 2
Correlation matrix among the corporate governance variables and performance measures
Tobin’s
Q

ROA

ROE

EVA

ROA

-0.032

ROE

0.085

0.788

EVA

0.118

0.246

0.189

%IND

-0.105

-0.166

-0.191

-0.144

%IND

NIND

0.054

0.111

0.173

0.131

-0.823

BDSIZE

-0.020

-0.011

-0.132

-0.070

-0.088

BUSY

-0.137

0.109

0.076

0.019

0.150

ACSIZE

-0.039

0.089

-0.027

-0.065

0.040

NIND

BDSIZE

0.044
0.156
0.084

0.055
0.312

BUSY

ACSIZE

BLOCK

LEV

B/M

0.069

BLOCK

0.011

0.025

0.021

-0.122

-0.066

0.058

-0.092

-0.071

-0.120

LEV

-0.052

-0.039

0.343

-0.086

-0.014

0.088

-0.106

0.071

-0.141

-0.137

B/M

-0.372

-0.205

-0.278

-0.158

0.020

0.079

0.030

0.070

-0.011

-0.217

SIZE

0.144

0.240

0.150

0.065

0.043

-0.16
0.118

0.390

0.196

0.107

0.258

-0.056

-0.150

Notes:
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is
return on assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested
capital – weighted average cost of capital). %IND is the proportion of independent directors on a board defined
as the number of independent directors/total number of directors. NIND is a dummy variable of 1 if a firm board
is nonindependent. BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who
serve in more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK
is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm.
LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market
value equity. There are 182 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2006.

Table 3 reports results for the OLS and 2-Stage regressions of firm performance on
corporate governance and control variables. The results from OLS and the 2-Stage
regressions are largely similar. Consistent with our first hypothesis, the proportion of
independent directors on a board (%IND) is negatively correlated with all four performance
measures and significantly correlated with ROA and ROE.3 These results point to the fact
that the presence of an independent board has a negative impact on firm value, and these
results are consistent with those reported in prior studies (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996; Bhagat
& Black 2002). Our findings, on the whole, contradict the notion that company boards should

3

The results are similar but of opposite signs when we use the proportion of non-independent directors (defined
as 1-%IND) instead of %IND. We find that non-independent directors are positively associated with the four
firm performance measures and significantly correlated with ROA and ROE. These results, to conserve space,
are not reported but are available upon request.
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consist mostly of independent directors. Board size (BDSIZE) is also negatively related to
performance and significantly related to ROA and ROE. This finding is consistent with prior
studies (Eisenberg et al. 1998; Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001;Yermack, 1996) showing that
the larger the board size, the less efficient the monitoring function of the directors, which
reduces the value of the company.
Table 3
Cross sectional regression results for firm performance on corporate governance variables

Intercept

OLS
2-SLS
Tobin’s Q
1.828**
0.772

-0.036

%IND

-0.585

-0.711

-0.115***

-0.146***

-0.215***

-0.249***

-0.015**

-0.005

BDSIZE

-0.057

-0.017

-0.013**

-0.015**

-0.029***

-0.034***

-0.002*

-0.001

BUSY

-0.522

-0.566*

0.033

0.003

0.034

-0.016

0.002

0.002

ACSIZE

-0.031

0.084

0.012

0.009

0.015

0.019

-0.001

-0.002

BLOCK

-0.427

-0.446

-0.033

-0.019

-0.018

-0.031

-0.016***

-0.011*

LEV

-0.941*

-0.36

-0.052

-0.047

0.324***

0.236**

-0.016**

0.003

B/M

-0.566***

-0.316***

-0.024**

-0.026***

-0.041**

-0.038**

-0.003**

-0.001

SIZE

0.155**

0.151*

0.023***

0.014*

0.034***

0.033**

0.002*

0.006***

Adj. R2
N

0.159
182

0.119
103

OLS

0.123
182

2-SLS
ROA
0.125

0.121
103

OLS
-0.078

0.221
182

2-SLS
ROE
0.025

0.148
103

OLS
0.016

0.078
182

2-SLS
EVA
-0.042***

0.206
103

Notes:
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets. ROE is return
on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested capital – weighted average cost of capital). %IND is the
proportion of independent directors on a board defined as the number of independent directors/total number of directors. BDSIZE is total
number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who serve in more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number
of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary
shares in the firm. LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value equity.
Sample period is from 2004 to 2006.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level

Table 3 also reports that blockholders (BLOCK) are negatively correlated with
performance. This result is similar to those reported in prior studies (Hossain, Prevost & Rao
2001; Johnson et al. 2000; Laporta et al. 1998) that show that high firm ownership
concentration has a somewhat negative impact on firm value.
The percentage of busy independent directors is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q,
suggesting that busy independent directors do not add value, as they may not be fully
committed to the company for which they sit as independent directors. The low average
percentage of busy directors on a board (as reported in Table 1), however, may explain the
weak significance of the relationship between the percentage of busy independent directors
and firm performance.
In Table 4, we report the results of cross-sectional regressions on the relationship
between the proportions of independent directors and lagged corporate governance variables.
We observe that the lagged performances are negatively correlated with independent
variables but are not statistically significant. These results confirm that endogeneity is not a
problem in our study, and the results are generally consistent with Dahya et al. (2008),
12
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showing that the relationship between firm performance and independent directors runs only
in one direction.
Table 4
Cross sectional regression results on the relation between the proportion of independent directors and
lagged corporate governance variables
Intercept

0.057

0.013

0.007

0.006

BLOCK

-0.026

-0.007

-0.009

-0.008

BLOCK-1

0.117

0.106

0.108

0.112

% SIND

0.928**

0.929**

0.918**

0.936**

% SIND-1

-0.870

-0.816

-0.809

-0.823

0.862***

0.853***

0.853***

0.858***

BDSIZE-1

-0.012

-0.013

-0.013

-0.013

BUSY-1

-0.082

-0.071

-0.071

-0.072

0.033**

0.033**

0.034**

0.032**

LEV-1

-0.111

-0.080

-0.062

-0.076

B/M-1

-0.015

0.011

0.009

0.014

SIZE-1

0.004

0.003

0.003

0.002

Tobin’s Q-1

-0.022

%IND-1

ACSIZE-1

-0.056

ROA-1
ROE-1

-0.047

EVA-1

Adj. R2
N
Notes:

-0.029

0.625

0.622

0.622

0.621

103

103

103

103

Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. The dependent variable is
%IND which is the proportion of independent directors on a board defined as the number of independent directors/total number
of directors. ROA is return on assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on
invested capital – weighted average cost of capital). %SIND is the proportion of shares owned by independent directors.
BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who serve in more than three other
companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK is the cumulative percentage of shares held by
shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. LEV is long-term debt/total assets. B/M is book to market ratio
and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value equity. Sample period is from 2004 to 2006.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

In Table 5, we present our results for the regression of firm performance variables on
non-independent boards and other corporate governance and control variables. The
coefficient of interest here is NIND, which positively correlates with four performance
measures and has a particularly significant relationship with ROA and ROE. These results are
essentially in line with our second hypothesis that independent directors add value as long as
13
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they are in the minority, but when they become the majority, their effectiveness as monitors
diminishes, which reduces firm value. The results for the other independent variables are
principally similar to those reported in Table 3. Board size, the proportion of busy
independent directors and blockholders are negatively correlated with firm performance. One
common factor that can be observed, as in prior studies, is that the presence of independent
directors is positively related to firm performance when they are the minority, but their
presence negatively affects firm value when they are the majority. This observation may
suggest that not all independent directors have the necessary knowledge, experience, time
and skills to be effective monitors (Klein 1998), and, consistent with stewardship theory, that
some or most of them are not good stewards of the companies they serve (Muth & Donaldson
1998).
As far as New Zealand is concerned, only one study has investigated the issue of
board composition and firm performance (Hossain, Prevost & Rao 2001). During the period
investigated, it can be noted that the independent directors of New Zealand firms were the
minority on a board in more than half of the sample period. Therefore, we possibly could
argue that the positive relationship between independent directors and performance reported
in that study could be attributed to the performance of a non-independent board and not to
that of an independent board. The proportion of independent directors at New Zealand firms
has been growing over time. Taking into account more recent practice, our current research
findings provide a worthwhile outcome for New Zealand.
Table 5
Cross sectional regression results on the relation between firm performance and the minority
independent directors
ROA

Tobin’s Q
0.422

0.037

ROE
-0.126

EVA
-0.046***

NIND

0.069

0.046**

0.083**

0.002

BDSIZE

0.000

-0.013**

-0.032**

-0.001

-0.589**

-0.002

-0.024

0.002

ACSIZE

0.065

0.004

0.011

-0.002*

BLOCK

-0.421

-0.021

-0.035

-0.011*

LEV

-0.314

-0.036

0.254**

0.003

B/M

-0.312***

-0.023**

-0.033*

-0.001

SIZE

0.141

0.013*

0.032**

0.006***

Adj. R2
N

0.107
103

0.109
103

0.144
103

0.209
103

Intercept

BUSY

Notes:
Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of market equity and book value of debt, divided by total assets. ROA is return on
assets. ROE is return on equity. EVA is invested capital at the beginning of year x (return on invested capital – weighted
average cost of capital). NIND is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if independent directors are the minority on
a board, 0 otherwise. BDSIZE is total number of directors. BUSY is the proportion of independent directors who serve in
more than three other companies. ACSIZE is the number of directors on the audit committee. BLOCK is the cumulative
percentage of shares held by shareholders holding at least 5% of ordinary shares in the firm. LEV is long-term debt/total
assets. B/M is book to market ratio and SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value equity. Sample period is from 2004
to 2006.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level
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Robustness Tests
Although the two-stage regression model can address endogeneity, the statistical properties of
the simultaneous regression estimates are sensitive to the choice of instrumental variables
because even the instrumental variables themselves can be partially endogenous (Larcker &
Rusticus 2006). Therefore, we address both the endogeneity and fixed panel effects by using
the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) method and a generalised method of moment
estimation (GMM). The GMM permits simultaneous control of both endogeneity and firm
fixed effects (Mura 2007). In addition to these two estimation methods for our robustness
tests, we also use the OLS method with adjustments in the standard errors of the OLS
estimators, assuming the presence of both firm and time fixed effects (Petersen 2009) 4.
The results, not reported here to save space, are all largely in line with those reported
in Table 3 and confirm our hypothesis that the presence of a majority of independent
directors on the board of New Zealand firms is negatively associated with firm performance.
Summary
In this paper, we examined the effects of independent directors on firm performance. We
found that, on average, independent directors are negatively associated with several measures
of performance. On the basis of our findings, we could argue that independent directors add
value only when they are in the minority. We note that the presence of independent directors
is negatively (positively) associated with firm performance when they are in the majority
(minority) on a board. Our results confirm recent findings in the literature that good
governance practices are not universal but may depend on market and firm characteristics
(Black et al. 2010; Coles et al. 2008; Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2007; Duchin et al. 2010).
A possible explanation as to why a board consisting mostly of independent directors
could have a negative impact on firm value could be that the behaviour of executive or nonindependent directors cannot be entirely explained by agency theory, which assumes that
managers maximise their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The New Zealand stock
market consists mostly of small firms suggesting that it may not be that easy for these firms
to have truly independent boards (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Duchin et al. 2010). The
relatively small size of the New Zealand market could also suggests that directors are
strongly network connected, a characteristic where stewardship theory is likely to hold (Muth
& Donaldson 1998). The stewardship theory, which contends that managers and nonindependent directors are good stewards of firm assets and are loyal to the company, predicts
a positive association between management and firm performance. Our results are more in
line with the latter theory for the period investigated in New Zealand.
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